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Abstract
Recent advances in the field of intrusion detection brought new requirements to intrusion prevention and
response. Traditionally, the response to the detected attack was selected and deployed manually, in the recent
years the focus has shifted towards developing automated and semi-automated methodologies for responding
to intrusions. In this context, the cost-sensitive intrusion response models have gained the most interest
mainly due to their emphasis on the balance between potential damage incurred by the intrusion and cost of
the response. However, one of the challenges in applying this approach is defining consistent and adaptable
measurement of these cost factors on the basis of requirements and policy of the system being protected
against intrusions. In this paper we present a structured methodology for evaluating cost of responses based
on three factors: the response operational cost associated with the daily maintenance of the response, the
response goodness that measures the applicability of the selected response for a detected intrusion and the
response impact on the system that refers to the possible response effect on the system functionality. The
proposed approach provides consistent basis for response evaluation across different systems while
incorporating security policy and properties of specific system environment. We demonstrate the advantages
of the proposed cost model and evaluate it on the example of three systems.
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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in the field of intrusion detection brought
new requirements to intrusion prevention and response. Tra-
ditionally, the response to the detected attack was selected
and deployed manually, in the recent years the focus has
shifted towards developing automated and semi-automated
methodologies for responding to intrusions. In this context,
the cost-sensitive intrusion response models have gained the
most interest mainly due to their emphasis on the balance
between potential damage incurred by the intrusion and cost
of the response. However, one of the challenges in applying
this approach is defining consistent and adaptable measure-
ment of these cost factors on the basis of requirements and
policy of the system being protected against intrusions.
In this paper we present a structured methodology for eval-
uating cost of responses based on three factors: the response
operational cost associated with the daily maintenance of the
response, the response goodness that measures the applica-
bility of the selected response for a detected intrusion and
the response impact on the system that refers to the possible
response effect on the system functionality. The proposed
approach provides consistent basis for response evaluation
across different systems while incorporating security policy
and properties of specific system environment. We demon-
strate the advantages of the proposed cost model and eval-
uate it on the example of three systems.
Keywords
intrusion response assessment, cost-sensitive intrusion re-
sponse
1. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of complex and fast-spreading intrusions
against computer systems brought new requirements to in-
trusion detection and response, demanding not only ad-
vances in intrusion detection mechanisms but also the devel-
opment of sophisticated and automated intrusion response
systems.
The majority of existing automatic intrusion response sys-
tems rely on the mapping of attacks to pre-defined responses [6,
7]. These approaches allow the system administrator to deal
with intrusions faster and more efficiently. However, they
lack flexibility mainly because few of these systems take into
account intrusion cost factors.
In recent years the trend toward cost-sensitive modeling of
response selection became more apparent [5, 1, 3, 12, 9]. The
primary aim for applying such models is to balance intrusion
damage and response cost to ensure adequate response with-
out sacrificing the normal functionality of the system under
attack. However, defining accurate measurement of these
cost factors is one of the challenges in using cost-sensitive
modeling approach.
Driving Problem. The traditional approach to the anal-
ysis of response cost is based on a manual assessment of
various factors such as response effectiveness, probability of
failure, expected duration of the response effect, etc [4]. This
approach is highly accurate as it involves expert knowledge
and judgment, however it often introduces a significant delay
in reacting to the failure, and thus is not always appropri-
ate in critical environments and unsuitable for automated
response systems.
Some of the existing models supporting automatic response
selection introduce response cost, along with intrusion dam-
age cost, as one of the factors in the intrusion severity assess-
ment for the attacked system and selection of the suitable
response strategy. However, they generally do not agree on
what constitutes the response cost and how it can be mea-
sured. Some suggest that response cost includes the labor
cost of personnel involved in response deployment and criti-
cality of the attack [5], others see response cost as a measure
of response effectiveness to a detected attack and its disrup-
tiveness to legitimate users [3].
Such disagreement primarily results from the lack of a con-
sistent and standardized approach to measuring response
cost. The goal of this work is to identify metrics representing
intrusion response cost and develop a structured methodol-
ogy for evaluating these metrics. Below we outline several
key considerations surrounding the intrusion response cost
followed by the primary contributions of this paper.
Solution Methodology. One of the challenging problems
in the context of intrusion response systems is to identify
whether or not a response should be deployed, in other
words, what is the best suited action when an intrusion is
detected. This problem primarily stems from the fact that
though responses are deployed with the goal of countering
an intrusion, they may not only fail but can also lead to
undesired effects on the system. Thus, often the primary
criteria in response selection mechanisms are the expected
effectiveness of the response against the intrusion and its
potential negative impact on the system.
The effectiveness of a response refers to both the ability of
the response to prevent or mitigate damage from the intru-
sion and the coverage of the response, i.e., the number of
intrusions it can potentially address. One of the intuitive
ways to measure the effect of the response is to consider the
system resources affected by the intrusion and protected by
the response.
Another factor characterizing the response is its potential ef-
fect on the system. While the responses are deployed against
a detected intrusion, they often alter the state of the system
negatively affecting system resources and leading to damage.
For example, complete network isolation of a Web server in
response to an SQL attack, although effectively stops the in-
trusion, also results in unavailability of service. While such
an intrusion response might be desirable in a security-critical
system, it is unacceptable in a service-oriented setting.
Although, the response effect on the detected intrusion and
its impact on the system resources are the primary charac-
teristics considered for intrusion response, there is a third
component that often remains behind the curtains, an op-
erational cost of the response in the form of administrator
time and additional system resources (i.e., storage, network
bandwidth, etc.) required for response setup and process-
ing. While this cost does not directly affect the attacked
system or the intrusion, it can significantly contribute to
the decision of which response to deploy.
In light of the above, we present a structured system inde-
pendent methodology for the evaluation of responses’ cost
based on the three parameters: (a) the response goodness in
addressing the detected intrusion(s) which includes the ef-
fectiveness of the response and its coverage capability, (b)
the damage incurred by a response on the system and (c) the
operational cost of a response on a given system.
Within this methodology, we propose to assess response im-
pact with respect to resources of the affected system. Our
model takes into account the relative importance of the sys-
tem resources determined through the review of the system
policy goals according to the following categories: confiden-
tiality, availability and integrity.
One of the important steps in this process is the analysis of
the system resources that includes the enumeration of the
available system resources and their classification. This not
only reveals the underlying ranking of the resources but also
provides a better understanding of the response impact.
Based on this analysis, the evaluation algorithm assesses the
response goodness in terms of the resources protected by the
response and the response damage in terms of the resources
impaired by the action. In addition to this, the proposed
model incorporates the operational cost of the response de-
fined with respect to human effort required, necessary sys-
tem resources and involved monetary expenses.
This methodology does not substitute the response selec-
tion process in case of detected intrusion, but rather allows
to evaluate the available responses on the consistent basis.
We have implemented the proposed response cost evaluation
methodology as semi-automated tool that can be employed
to guide system administrators during the response selection
process.
Contributions. The main contributions can be summa-
rized as follows:
1. Structured and comprehensive methodology for
assigning response costs: the proposed model presents
the first roadmap for defining a standardized metric for
response cost evaluation.
2. System independent evaluation model: the pro-
posed model is adaptable to different environment set-
tings, ie. systems with widely varying operational re-
quirements.
3. Consistent response metrics: the proposed eval-
uation metrics are defined in terms of the system re-
sources that bring a common ground to the assessment
process.
4. Adaptable evaluation metrics: the response met-
rics are quantified with respect to the security policies
and properties of the specific system. Thus, the com-
puted costs can be effortlessly adjusted as and when
the system requirements are modified.
5. Practical applicability: the advantages of the pro-
posed model are demonstrated on the example of three
systems.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. A brief overview of related work is given in Sec-
tion 2. Section 3 outlines the response cost evaluation ap-
proach. Sections 4 and 5 provide the details of the response
goodness and response system impact evaluation. Experi-
mental setup and results are given in Section 6. Section 7
concludes the paper with our future work.
2. RELATED WORK
A number of techniques aiming at enhancing intrusion re-
sponse automation were proposed and deployed over the last
five years. A comprehensive review of this research work is
given by Stakhanova et al. [10]. Comparatively the field of
the response cost assessment has received considerably less
attention.
The approach to intrusion response proposed by Lee et al. [5]
is based on a combination of intrusion detection and re-
sponse factors. Three cost factors were identified: opera-
tional cost which includes the cost of processing and ana-
lyzing data for detecting the intrusion, damage cost which
assesses the amount of damage that could potentially be
caused by the attack and response cost which characterizes
the operational cost of reaction to the intrusion. These fac-
tors present the foundation of the intrusion cost model, i.e.
total expected cost of intrusion detection, and consequently
provide a basis for the selection of an appropriate response.
Another approach called ADEPTS, Adaptive Intrusion Re-
sponse using Attack Graphs, proposed by Foo et al. [3],
employs attack graphs to identify the actions required to
achieve possible attack targets in a distributed system, and
consequently, to show the objectives of suitable responses.
Attacker goals are expressed as end states in the attack
graph with intermediate steps leading to the fulfillment of
those goals. Responses are selected to frustrate attack goals
based on effectiveness to that particular attack in the past,
disruptiveness to legitimate users and the confidence level
which indicates the probability that the attack is actually
taking place.
Models proposed by Toth and Kruegel [11], Balepin et al. [1]
and Jahnke [4] not only consider costs and benefits of the
responses, but also introduce a link between the cost of re-
sponses and the system resources in the network.
The approach proposed by Toth and Kruegel is a network-
based response mechanism that builds a dependency tree of
the resources on the network. The proposed algorithm for
optimal response selection takes into account the penalty
cost of a resource being unavailable and the capability of
a resource that indicates the resource performance if the
specified response strategy is triggered, compared to the sit-
uation when all resources are available. Clearly, the set of
responses with the least negative impact on the system (low-
est penalty cost) is chosen to be applied in response to the
detected intrusion.
An approach proposed by Jahnke [4] also attempts to quan-
tify response measures based on modeling system resources
as a dependency graph. Although this method requires care-
ful graph construction and validation, it allows automatic
assessment of the response success computed through the
change of the availability of resource nodes in the graph and
required effort or cost defined as the amount of instances to
be modified for deploying the selected response.
A similar approach, for host-based intrusion detection and
response, was proposed by Balepin et al. [1] . The local re-
source hierarchy is modeled as a directed graph where the
nodes represent specific system resources and the edges are
the dependencies between them. Each node is associated
with a list of responses that can be applied to restore work-
ing state of resource in case of an attack. A particular re-
sponse for a node is selected based on (a) the cost of the
response, the sum of the resources that will be affected by
the response action, (b) the benefit of the response, the sum
of the nodes, previously affected by intrusion that will be
restored to working state, and (c) the cost of the resource,
the quantification of the importance of the resource.
While these approaches include response cost as a necessary
measurement in the response selection process, each com-
putes response cost using different techniques. In this work
we attempt to generalize the response cost metric and ad-
dress the following:
• The existing models are system dependent. Most of
these approaches focus on networks of systems [3, 11,
4], with only few considering host-based response [5,
1]. However, with the exception of [1], they are all
specifically designed to reflect characteristics of the
considered system. This significantly limits the appli-
cability of the models to varying system constraints,
and thus, their practicality. In this work we propose
a common methodology for response cost estimation
that is adaptable to different environment settings.
• The existing models only partially outline the factors
contributing to response cost. While most of these ap-
proaches use the concept of response benefit or effec-
tiveness as a factor related to the response’s ability to
mitigate the intrusion damage, the operational cost of
the response is not included. Our model incorporates
three major components that define response cost: re-
sponse goodness, response impact on the system and
response operational cost.
• The existing models lack consistency with each other.
Each model approaches response cost evaluation from
a different perspective. Foo et al. [3] measures the re-
sponse effectiveness against a detected attack based on
the past experience. Lee et al. [5] relates the response
cost to the required labor efforts, while the works by
[11], [1]. and [4] consider response cost in association
with the system resources, but with varying evaluation
methods. [1] measures the response cost as the sum of
manually assigned costs of affected resources. [11] cal-
culates response cost as a function of system capabil-
ity reduction, while [4] essentially extends the idea in
[11] by adding a fine-grained quantification of system
resource unavailability. The emerging theme in these
works effectively establishes the idea of employing sys-
tem resources to estimate response cost, and based on
this promising trend we work to build a structured
and consistent methodology for response cost assess-
ment based on the resources of the system. Thus our
model can be viewed as a generalization of the existing
approaches.
Our aim is to preserve the strengths of these works while
avoiding their disadvantages. Toward this end, the proposed
model identifies the major factors that constitute the re-
sponse cost. We also provide a comprehensive step-by-step
methodology for the automatic and consistent assessment of
these factors, accounting for system-specific confidentiality,
reliability and availability requirements.
3. RESOURCE COST EVALUATION MODEL:
OVERVIEW
The evaluation of the intrusion response cost is performed
in three dimensions: the operational cost (OC) of a response
in a given environment, the response goodness (RG) with re-
spect to detected intrusion(s) and the response impact on
the system(RSI).
The operational cost of a response measures various aspects
of the response associated with its daily maintenance. The
response goodness provides a measure of the ability of the
corresponding response to mitigate damage caused by the
intrusion to the system resources. Finally, the impact of a
response on the system quantifies the negative effect of the
response on the system resources and is estimated indepen-
dently from the response success or failure in countering the
intrusion(s).
Intuitively, the combination of the OC and the RSI constitutes
the penalty associated with the response, while the RG is the
benefit of this response measure. One simple cost model
describing the overall measure of response cost RC is:
RC =
OC+ RSI
2
− RG (1)
3.1 Methodology For Response Cost Evalua-
tion
Figure 1 presents the overview of steps for evaluating the
response cost RC (following Equation 1). In the following,
we discuss each step in detail.
Step 1: System classification . The first step in quanti-
fying the cost of a response involves determining the charac-
teristics of the computing environment where the response
will be deployed.
Generally, the systems can be classified according to the
security policy goals of the organization into two broad cat-
egories:
• open access systems have minor or no restrictions.
Example of such systems are the public networks pro-
vided at airport, city, etc. Other examples would in-
clude public web servers, DNS servers, or e-mail ser-
vices offered for general public consumption.
• limited access systems are systems that require rig-
orous authentication and can be further classified ac-
cording to their primary emphasis as follows:
– safety-critical systems emphasize the necessity
of service availability and, in case of failure, re-
quire a safe degradation of services they provide.
– security-critical systems focus on security, and
thus, have data confidentiality and integrity as
their primary concerns.
– business-critical systems are a combination of
safety and security-critical systems. The primary
goal of a business-critical system is profit or busi-
ness security. As such, safety-critical requirements
like service availability and system performance
are tightly coupled with equally valuable require-
ments of data confidentiality and integrity.
The above classification provides important insights to the
risks that each class of systems can tolerate, and therefore
helps in measuring the cost for various types of intrusion
damages. For example, a public Web server and a finan-
cial processing system will have different sensitivities toward
data confidentiality and availability. Even within a system
class, security priorities can differ. For instance, a business
critical Web server used to accept product orders may have
very different requirements from the one used to process
payroll.
Step 2: The system policy goals. The determination of
the importance of the system policy goals, and subsequently,
the assessment of the potential risks are the responsibili-
ties of the organization to which the system belongs. It
is usually a manual process consisting of an informal series
of questions such as “Will data be exposed?”, “How criti-
cal is the confidentiality of the data?”, “How concerned are
we with data integrity?”, “Will service availability be im-
pacted?”, etc. This provides an ad-hoc relative assessment
of the system goals for the organization. Based on the above
observation, system policy goals can be classified as follows:
1. Confidentiality refers to the imposed restrictions on
information flows, e.g., restricted access to data.
2. Integrity is a guarantee of the consistency and accuracy
of the information or the system computing environ-
ment as a whole.
3. Availability indicates the requirement of (functionality,
storage etc.) service and information availability upon
request.
These categories of system goals are ranked according to
their importance (a value between 0 for no importance and 1
for absolute importance) in a particular system type (safety-
critical, security-critical, etc.). These decisions can be based
on monetary values or other established business metrics for
the cost of failure to meet system goals (e.g., the estimated
dollar cost of a confidentiality breach). In the case of a
classified data processing system (a security-critical system),
for instance, data confidentiality may be a 1, indicating the
absolute importance of this security facet for this system.
1: The system classification:
-identify the type of the system according to the security priorities
2: The system policy goals:
-assign weights to system policy goals for the system
3: The system resources:
-enumerate resources available on the given system
-determine the resource importance for each system policy category
-compute the overall resource weight for the system policy
4: The response taxonomy:
-identify the responses suitable for the system
5: The response operational cost:
-assess the operational cost of the responses
6: The response goodness:
-assess the goodness of the responses
7: The response impact on the system:
-compute the impact of the available responses on the given system
Figure 1: The methodology for intrusion response cost evaluation.
Step 3: System resources. Responses are reactions to
the intrusions and are directed to protect the system re-
sources threatened by an attack. System resources can be
broadly viewed as the system assets (e.g., host, network,
etc.), services provided by the system (e.g., FTP, HTTP,
file system, etc.) and users served by the system.
One of the initial steps in the process of computing a re-
sponse impact measure is the enumeration of the resources
available in the considered system. The importance of a
resource depends on the system policy goals which in turn
depend on the type of system. For example, for a simple
Web server, availability is an important policy goal and ac-
cordingly important resources will include HTTP. Therefore,
the resources are assigned weights according to their im-
portance for each system policy goal for a specific system.
The overall weight of the system resource, denoted by WSR,
is computed as a combination of the resource importance
for each policy goal category SRimportancei (i is the pol-
icy category index) and the system specific category weight
PolicyCategoryWeighti (weight of the i-th policy category
index):
WSR =
X
i
[SRimportancei × PolicyCategoryWeighti] (2)
To illustrate this process, lets consider the example of the
network interface resource and its importance for each pol-
icy category for an open access system (i.e., a public Web
server):
Policy Goal Resource Importance
Category Weight Network Access
Data confidentiality 0 0.1
Data availability 1.0 1.0
Data integrity 0.7 0.1
Following Equation 2, the weight of the network interface
resource for the system policy is computed as follows:
WNetworkAccess = 0× 0.1 + 1.0× 1.0 + 0.7× 0.1 = 1.07
Step 4: Taxonomy of responses. Once the system goals
are identified, its resources are enumerated and their im-
portance is quantified based on the system goals, the next
step is to identify the set of responses that are suitable for
a system. Generally, the responses are deployed to either
counter possible attacks and defend the system resources
or regain secure system state. Thus, the selection of appli-
cable responses primarily depends on the identified system
resources. In this work, we identify the set of appropriate re-
sponses based on the general taxonomy of intrusion response
actions developed by [8].
Steps 5-7: Assessment of response cost. One of the
challenges in assessing response cost is to accurately de-
fine numeric values. Assigning monetary values to reflect
response cost, although provides concrete metric, is not al-
ways possible. More effective solution can be provided with
the use of the relative measurements constructed based on
system-specific policies.
The assessment of response operational cost is generally in-
dependent from the system policy and includes the cost for
the setup and deployment of the response, and data pro-
cessing overhead needed to analyze the result of response.
For example, “the system logging” response is fairly easy to
setup. However, it requires significant storage resources and
often incurs high processing overhead. Broadly, the involved
operational expenses can be classified on the basis of three
requirements: human resources which refer to administra-
tor time, system resources, which include storage, network
bandwidth, processor time, etc., and direct expenses which
include data processing fees by a third party, subscription
service fees, cost of components replacement, etc. Determin-
ing these factors is a manual process that involves expert
knowledge and a high degree of judgment.
At the same time the other two factors: the applicability
of the selected responses for a detected intrusion (response
goodness) and the assessment of the possible response ef-
fects on the system (response system impact), can be only
evaluated in the context of the system.
Thus, the proposed computation model for these factors in-
1: The applicable responses for intrusions:
-determine suitable responses for deployment attack
signatures
2: The response goodness:
-compute the goodness measures for responses in terms
of known attacks
Figure 2: Intrusion response goodness estimation
steps.
tegrates the relative impact of the intrusion response with
the environmental factors of the system. The proceeding
sections elaborate on our model to measure the response
goodness and impact of the response on the system.
4. ASSESSING THE RESPONSE GOODNESS
The steps for evaluating the response goodness are presented
in Figure 2.
Step 1: Applicable responses. . Often the detection
mechanism of the intrusion detection system (IDS) provides
administrators with a set of alerts indicating potential at-
tacks rather than a specific intrusion. When this situation
arises, the response needs to be deployed preemptively on
the basis of high likelihood of possible intrusions. In these
cases, the response is evaluated based on the number of pos-
sible intrusions it can potentially address, and consequently,
the number of resources that can be protected by the re-
sponse. In practice, the applicability of responses to poten-
tial attacks can be determined through the analysis of the
existing intrusion signatures in the IDS.
Step 2: Response goodness. . The response goodness
includes a review of the availability of the system resources
involved in the intrusion. For example, an alert triggered
on TFTP traffic on port 69 should not be accounted for in
the response goodness assessment if TFTP protocol is not
currently supported.
The goodness of the response Ri where i ∈ [1 . . . m] (m differ-
ent responses) against the intrusion Ij potentially affecting
n system resources SRj1, SR
j
2, . . . SR
j
n is computed as follows:
RGRi(Ij) =
X
k∈[1...n]
Avail(SRjk)× WSRk (3)
where Avail(SRjk) is a binary value that denotes the avail-
ability of k-th system resource that can be affected by Ij and
WSRk is the resource weight (as computed by Equation 2 in
Section 3.1). To ensure the consistency of the computed
metric, RG values are normalized within a range of [0, 1]
by dividing individual RGRi(Ij) by the normalization term,
MAX(RG(Ij)) which is the maximum RG value computed for
available responses for the intrusion Ij , i.e.,
MAX(RG(Ij)) = RGRl(Ij) such that
l ∈ [1 . . . m] ∧ ∀i ∈ [1 . . . m] : RGRi(Ij) ≤ RGRl(Ij)
In the rest of the paper, we will refer to RGRi(Ij) to mean its
normalized valuation.
5. ASSESSING THE RESPONSE IMPACT ON
THE SYSTEM
The step-by-step process for evaluation of the response im-
pact on the considered system is presented in Figure 3.
Step 1: Response Impact on System Resources. The
impact of a response is evaluated based on the defined sys-
tem goals and their importance. The impact assessment
process for a specific response includes three steps. First,
identify the system resources affected by each response. Sec-
ond, for each resource, order the responses on the basis of
how they are affecting the resource. Finally, compute the
negative impact of the responses on the associated resource
using the ordering obtained above. Eventually, the impact
of a response on the system as a whole will be an aggrega-
tion of the response’s impact on the resources present in the
system.
For each response we determine the system resources it may
affect. For instance, blocking a specific subnet can protect
the network interface resource and also disrupt legitimate
user activities. After all responses are categorized within
the considered system resource, we independently evaluate
each system resource. All responses affecting the resource
are ordered or ranked based on their relative impact on the
considered resource, from the greatest impact to the least
impact, and assigned an index i ∈ [0 . . . (m−1)], where m is
the total number of responses in the list corresponding to a
particular resource. A response with rank i has more impact
on the corresponding resource than the response with rank
j (i < j). These ranks are based on historical data and/or
the expertise of the system administrator. We quantify the
impact using the rank as follows:
ImpactRi,SR = 1−
i
m
(4)
where Ri is the i-th ranked response. The resultant valua-
tion is between 1
m
and 1. To illustrate this process, lets con-
sider the example of the network interface resource. The set
of available responses are ranked according to their impact
and the corresponding impact quantification is computed as
follows:
Rank i Responses for SR (Ri) ImpactRi,SR
0. Complete network isolation 1 - 0/5 = 1.0
1. Network isolation: block subnet 0.8
2. Terminate process 0.6
3. Delay suspicious process 0.4
4. Deploy intrusion analysis tools 0.2
Generally, the values determined as a result of ranking are
dependent on the characteristics of system environment. Thus,
changes in the environment, i.e., modifications in the soft-
ware usage, addition of network equipment, new knowledge
or skills gained by the administrator, etc., can affect the
order and relative severity of the responses. Thus, as the
settings of the environment change, these values may be
manually adjusted to more accurately reflect relative dam-
age on the system resources.
For instance, automatically restarting terminated processes
1: Response Impact on System Resources:
-identify the system resources affected by each response
-order responses for each system resource based on their relative
impact on that resource
-for each system resource assign numeric value to responses according
to their place in that list
2: The Overall Response System Impact:
-compute the impact values for the available responses on the given system
Figure 3: Intrusion response system impact assessment process.
may justify changing the network interface impact rating of
Terminate process to 0.2. In addition, a uniform distribu-
tion of responses according to their order may not always
be appropriate. For instance, if two responses affect a re-
source in an identical fashion, then manual adjustment may
be necessary. Note that these adjustments are made on an
environmental and technical basis only, independent of the
policy implications.
Step 2: The Overall Response System Impact Com-
putation. The overall impact of the response measure is
estimated based on the weight of the system resource for
a specific system policy (Equation 2 in Section 3) and the
impact value of the response for that resource (Equation 4).
The overall rating of the response Ri on the system, the
response system impact, denoted by RSIRi , is computed as
follows:
RSIRi =
X
SR
ImpactRi,SR × WSR (5)
Similar to RG valuations (Equation 3 in Section 4), we nor-
malize RSIRi using the maximum valuation of RSI for any
response.
While manual assignment of some values is inevitable, these
abstractions allow an expert to focus separately on the tech-
nical nature of the responses and the high-level goals of the
system. In many cases, two different individuals or groups
are uniquely qualified to make the respective technical and
policy based decisions. As such if the environment changes,
the system administrator can modify the high-level system
goals while a technical specialist adjusts response damage
factors based on changes to the system or network envi-
ronment. Such separation of concern reduces the decision
complexity, and therefore, the risk of human error.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.1 Case Study
We have implemented the proposed response cost evaluation
methodology as semi-automated tool that relies on adminis-
trator to provide system resource values and ranking of the
responses according to their impact on resources. Using this
tool we have analyzed the response costs of the following
three systems: a public web server, security critical system
and a user desktop workstation.
A public web server example. A public web server can
be classified as an open access system (see Step 1 in Sec-
tion 3.1) and is characterized by a high priority of service
availability and integrity with a low focus on confidential-
ity. A typical example of such a system is an informational
web page for a small business. To reflect the priorities of
such a server, the following system policy goal values were
pre-assigned (see Step 2 in Section 3.1):
availability: 1, confidentiality: 0 and integrity: 0.7
The set of server resources used in our case study includes file
system, network interface, processor and system memory.
The corresponding resource weights for the system policy
goals are given in Table 1 (following Step 3 in Section 3.1).
Table 2 provides the details of the responses. The response
goodness and response system impact values are computed
from the resource impact along with the resource weights
from Table 1. The operational cost value for each category
is directly assigned based on the maximum expected cost
associated with the response. For example, Delay suspi-
cious process may not cause any additional labor, but it
complicates the follow-up debugging and analysis thus re-
sulting on labor weight =0.6. The normalized total of OC
value is the sum of the category values normalized by the
maximum total over all responses.
To evaluate our response cost model, we used a subset of
the response measures generated by [8]. Specifically, the
following set of responses was considered:
• Allow read/write dummy version of file: This re-
sponse either makes a dummy copy of a file, or filters
the file “on the fly” (i.e., a process dynamically blocks
certain information from being read from or written to
the file) to ensure that only safe content is provided for
reading or writing. This action primarily protects the
file system resource by preserving integrity of and con-
fidentiality of files. It also provides indirect protection
to the CPU, memory, and network interface resources
which may be affected by reading or executing mali-
cious content which would have been written to a file.
However, deploying this response also changes the sys-
tem interactions with files, causes additional load on
the processor, and may require memory to store mod-
ified versions of the file.
• Backup tampered with files: Creating a simple backup
of files that may be tampered with is an effective way
to protect file system data, and possibly intrusion ev-
idence as well. While having virtually no load on the
system, this response does carry an operational cost
in both resources and labor as it requires storage re-
Resource
Policy Goals
Resource Weight Overall Resource
Category Weight Weight (W )
File system availability 1.0 0.7
1.4confidentiality 0.0 0.2
integrity 0.7 1
Network interface availability 1.0 1.0
1.07confidentiality 0.0 0.1
integrity 0.7 0.1
Processor availability 1.0 1.0
1.21confidentiality 0.0 0
integrity 0.7 0.3
System memory availability 1.0 1
1.49confidentiality 0.0 0.6
integrity 0.7 0.7
Table 1: System Resources
sources and human effort to clean out the repository
or restore files.
• Delay suspicious process: Delaying a suspicious pro-
cess can disrupt the timing of an intrusion, often pre-
venting it from functioning. This gives time for deploy-
ing additional response measures and offers protection
to all system resources by providing a safe time win-
dow to complete critical tasks. However, the temporal
nature of this response adds considerable complexity
to the environment for follow-up forensic analysis, in-
curring labor operational cost, and also affecting both
the processor and, in the event of a network process,
network interface.
• Deploy intrusion analysis tools: Performing de-
tailed intrusion analysis in an automated manner pro-
vides additional recovery and forensics information,
and can be used to support better automated deci-
sion making. However, it will not offer any system re-
source protection and can cause additional processor
load and network traffic delay due to packet intercep-
tion and analysis. This response also tends to generate
a large amount of data requiring labor to analyze and
a significant amount of storage, which is reflected in a
high labor and resource values of operational cost.
• Detailed logging: This response provides detailed
information about system events, giving a substan-
tial advantage in recovery and forensic analysis, and
it carries virtually no negative impact to the system.
However it does not provide any direct system resource
protection. The operational cost of this response in-
volves significant human efforts required to analyze the
log files, and considerable storage resources, so it car-
ries a high OC value in both labor and resources.
• Disallow access to file: This is one of the most
effective measures against malicious file access. Simi-
lar to Allow read/write dummy version of file re-
sponse, this action protects all considered resources.
Due to its predictable behavior and simplicity in im-
plementation, the response impact on the file system
and processor is significantly lower. However, the re-
sponse adds the risk of completely blocking access to
a file, and thus, can disrupt the legitimate activity of
users. Because the response is likely to require ad-
ministrator attention, there is a labor operational cost
associated with it.
• Network isolation from specific subnet: Filtering
network traffic from a suspect subnet without com-
pletely disrupting traffic flow, prevents further exploita-
tion of the system and effectively protects system re-
sources from attack. At the same time, this response
impacts the network interface for the legitimate traffic
from that subnet. Eventually this response is likely
to carry an operational cost associated with the addi-
tional labor for analysis of the blocking action.
• Complete network isolation: Filtering all network
traffic prevents any network-based attack from being
effective, thus, protecting all system resources other
than networking, which is made useless. From the op-
erational cost perspective, this action will result in ad-
ditional labor cost from analyzing the block filter and
determining the conditions of network access restora-
tion.
• Process isolation: different environment: Pro-
cess isolation in a different environment (e.g., to a vir-
tual machine, a sandbox) provides many benefits to
intrusion detection and response essentially allowing
accurate detection of the attack and approximation of
the potential damage. However, providing such a sim-
ulated environment requires a significant amount of
processing power and memory. It also carries signifi-
cant operational costs through additional resources for
storage and operation of the parallel environment, di-
rect monetary expenses if a third-party service is used,
and administrator time needed to maintain the virtual
environment. Thus the overall operational cost for this
response is ranked the highest.
• Terminate process: Terminating the suspicious pro-
cess potentially prevents malicious instructions from
being executed entirely. When deployed on fine-grained
level (e.g., killing suspicious MySQL threads in the event
of an SQL-Injection attack), this response can be tar-
geted to minimize the system impact on access. How-
ever, it still carries a large risk of preventing legitimate
access to the system, especially in case of critical ser-
vices. From the operational cost point of view, debug-
ging processes killed in the past can be tedious and
may require significant labor and system resources.
Response System Resource Protected Operational cost
Name Rank Impact resources Category Weight
Allow read/write dummy file system 0/2 1 1 direct 0
version of file network interface n/a 0 1 labor 0.2
processor 3/5 0.4 1 resources 0
system memory 0/2 1 1 normalized total 0.1
Backup tampered with files file system n/a 0 1 direct 0
network interface n/a 0 0 labor 0.1
processor n/a 0 0 resources 0.3
system memory n/a 0 0 normalized total 0.2
Delay suspicious process file system n/a 0 1 direct 0
network interface 3/5 0.4 1 labor 0.6
processor 0/5 1 1 resources 0
system memory n/a 0 1 normalized total 0.3
Deploy intrusion file system n/a 0 0 direct 0
analysis tools network interface 4/5 0.2 0 labor 0.9
processor 1/5 0.8 0 resources 1
system-memory n/a 0 0 normalized total 0.95
Detailed logging file system n/a 0 0 direct 0
network interface n/a 0 0 labor 0.8
processor n/a 0 0 resources 0.666
system memory n/a 0 0 normalized total 0.733
Disallow access to file file-system 1/2 0.5 1 direct 0
network interface n/a 0 1 labor 0.5
processor n/a 0 1 resources 0
system memory n/a 0 1 normalized total 0.25
Network-isolation: file system n/a 0 1 direct 0
from specific subnet network interface 1/5 0.8 1 labor 0.7
processor n/a 0 1 resources 0.1
system memory n/a 0 1 normalized total 0.4
Complete network isolation file system n/a 0 1 direct 0
network interface 0/5 1 0 labor 1
processor n/a 0 1 resources 0.1
system memory n/a 0 1 normalized total 0.55
Process isolation: file system n/a 0 1 direct 0.7
different environment network interface n/a 0 1 labor 0.3
processor 2/5 0.6 1 resources 1
system memory 1/2 0.5 1 normalized total 1
Terminate process file system n/a 0 1 direct 0
network interface 2/5 0.6 1 labor 0.4
processor 4/5 0.2 1 resources 0.1
system memory n/a 0 1 normalized total 0.25
Table 2: Response Characteristics
Response Operational System Response Response
Cost Resource Goodness Cost
Impact
Disallow access to file 0.25 0.207 1 -0.771
Terminate process 0.25 0.262 1 -0.744
Network isolation from specific subnet 0.4 0.254 1 -0.673
Delay suspicious process 0.3 0.485 1 -0.607
Allow read/write dummy 0.1 1 1 -0.45
version of file
Complete network isolation 0.55 0.317 0.793 -0.359
Process isolation: 1 0.436 1 -0.282
different environment
Backup tampered with files 0.2 0 0.271 -0.171
Detailed logging 0.733 0 0 0.367
Deploy intrusion analysis tools 0.95 0.35 0 0.65
Table 3: Response Actions Evaluation Results: a public web server
Analysis of response cost. Table 3 demonstrates the re-
sponse cost RC calculation for the set of responses, based
on Operational Cost OC, Response System Impact RSI and
Response Goodness RG. Generally, the response cost can be
viewed as the potential risk of using the response in the sys-
tem. As such low cost values indicate the responses that are
more beneficial for the system, and thus, preferred in case
of attack.
For our evaluation we considered response cost measure-
ments in the context of an SQL Injection attack. The attack
takes advantage of database vulnerabilities in the applica-
tion layer. Using incorrect query input through abuse of
webpage form fields, or submission of custom HTTP queries,
the attacker can perform arbitrary commands on the sys-
tem [2]. One of the dangers of this attack is the potentially
damaging effect on all resources of the system.
As the results show, the most beneficial response in a public
web server system is the Disallow access to file response
(RC =−0.771). While it has less potential to cause major
file system problems and to affect service availability, it still
provides a protection to resources from malicious content
uploaded to the system.
On the other hand, the responses Detailed intrusion analysis
tools (RC=0.65) and Detailed-logging (RC=0.367) are ranked
as the most costly actions. Though having little negative
impact on the system resources and practically no protection
against the intrusion, both responses incur high operational
cost. Their response cost RC valuation reflects this situation.
Another example of operational cost impact can be noted
between Complete network isolation and Process isolation
different environment responses. While process isolation is
considered more effective based on the protected system re-
sources, network isolation is preferred. This is primarily due
to the significant operational cost of process isolation. From
a system administrator perspective, it is much easier to ana-
lyze a network filter than a complex simulated environment
for a process. In addition, the possibility of data integrity
loss is much lower due to blocking network access than it is
due to specific process migration to different environment.
The response with the largest direct impact to the system,
based on a resource analysis, is Allowing read/write access
to a dummy version of the file. Due to its processor load,
the memory requirements, and the potential for file system
inconsistencies, this response is the most resource intensive
to deploy. However, its low operational cost and univer-
sal effectiveness at protecting system resources places it in
the middle of the response list. While this response has a
smaller impact on data availability than blocking file access
does, it has a larger impact on integrity. With the system
integrity value of 0.7, malicious updates of the data need to
be stopped even at a high cost in other areas. Thus, blocking
access to a file entirely is preferred over restricted access.
Considered in the context of a public access system under-
going a powerful SQL Injection attack, the evaluation re-
sults show that a relative assessment of responses based on
high-level system policy goals and system resources allows
administrators to effectively quantify response cost parame-
ters in a way that supports automated analysis and selection
of responses against the detected intrusions.
The current evaluation of the responses is based on the anal-
ysis of the calculated response cost values in the context of
one SQL Injection attack. In the intrusion detection and
response system, the evaluation of the applicable response
actions is performed through various response selection tech-
niques which alone with the response cost, consider factors
such as the likelihood of detected intrusions, the potential
damage incurred by the attacks to the system, etc.
Response cost for other types of systems. Similarly
to a public web server, we have analyzed the cost of the
same response set for two other systems: a classified research
system and a user desktop workstation.
A security critical mainly prioritizes data confidentiality and
integrity, putting less emphasis on system performance, hu-
man resources, and storage. One example of such system is
a CIA database server.
On the other hand, a user desktop workstation is a typi-
cal user station that has high data availability, moderate
system performance and data integrity, with data confiden-
tiality and human resources being less critical. Usually the
Classified system A user desktop station
Response Operational System Response Response Operational System Response Response
Cost Resource Goodness Cost Cost Resource Goodness Cost
Impact Impact
Disallow access to file 0.25 0.205 1 -0.772 0.25 0.198 1 -0.776
Terminate process 0.25 0.142 1 -0.804 0.25 0.254 1 -0.748
Network isolation: 0.4 0.139 1 -0.73 0.4 0.249 1 -0.676
from specific subnet
Delay suspicious process 0.3 0.258 1 -0.721 0.3 0.46 1 -0.62
Allow read/write dummy 0.1 1 1 -0.45 0.1 1 1 -0.45
version of file
Complete network isolation 0.55 0.174 0.865 -0.503 0.55 0.311 0.794 -0.364
Process isolation: 1 0.37 1 -0.315 1 0.436 1 -0.282
different environment
Backup tampered with files 0.2 0 0.319 -0.219 0.2 0 0.262 -0.162
Detailed logging 0.733 0 0 0.367 0.733 0 0 0.367
Deploy intrusion 0.95 0.186 0 0.568 0.95 0.331 0 0.64
analysis tools
Table 4: Response Actions Evaluation Results for Various Systems
latter two priorities are provided by a dedicated support
group.
Table 4 demonstrates the response cost calculation for these
systems. The ranking of the responses among considered
systems has of a lot of similarities: the responses Detailed
intrusion analysis tools and Detailed-logging are considered
as the most costly actions, while the Disallow access to file
and Terminate process are ranked as the most beneficial
responses. At the same time, there are some interesting
differences that should be noted.
Terminate process has a significantly lower system impact on
the security critical system than it does on the user desktop
since the primary affect resource here is availability. Con-
sequently, this response will be chosen first on a security
critical system, but second on a user desktop, where Dis-
allowing access to a file is preferred. Intuitively, it is less
disrupting for a normal user to have a blocked access to one
file, while being able to continue work, than to have request
process repeatedly killed. On the other hand, a security crit-
ical system puts a priority on protecting system data from
unauthorized access, and thus, Terminate the process is pre-
ferred response here.
Similarly, Complete network isolation response is more costly
compare to Allow read/write access to a dummy version of
a file, since it is less costly restrict file access than to com-
pletely isolate a user who relies on the network services.
Other interesting thing between these two systems is that
the response goodness is higher overall for the security crit-
ical system, while the system resource impact tends to be
lower. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the con-
sidered responses affect resource availability more than con-
fidentiality. Thus, the higher priority of the availability is
on a system, the higher cost of the responses will tend to
be. However, since the intrusion potentially affects confi-
dentiality, the goodness of the responses tends to be higher
on the security critical system, consequently, putting more
pressure on deploying responses that are more likely to stop
the attack.
6.2 Practical exercise
To evaluate the practical value of our approach, we con-
ducted an experiment where we asked system administrators
to rank the set of response actions using their traditional
methods according to responses’ priority to be deployed on
the system in the case of an SQL injection attack.
In the experiment we offered four types of system: public
web server, classified, medical data repository and reception-
ist workstation and a set of responses described in Table 2.
We recruited 9 system administrators with different level of
expertise (5 experts and 4 with moderate level of expertise).
The motivation for the experiment was to evaluate the con-
sistency of the response cost assessment using our method-
ology in comparison with the traditional approach primarily
based on the manual selection of responses according to the
administrator expertise.
Surprisingly, the results showed a substantial variability in
the response ranking among administrators. The rank or-
der correlation coefficients between any two rankings are in
the range of {−0.74, 0.15}. This means that ranking is not
consistent neither among experts, nor among administra-
tors with moderate expertise level, and consequently, varis
from the ranking determined by our approach. As one of
the responders noted, the response ranking provided by our
method characterized a smooth process for system admin-
istrators to follow during an attack, while his personal re-
sponse preference is an overreaction to the situation.
This provides strong testimony that even experienced ad-
ministrators need a standardized metric for evaluating in-
trusion responses that would allow to assess the costs in-
volved in each response deployment in a consistent manner.
Our approach can be employed by system administrators to
guide them through the response selection process
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a comprehensive and struc-
tured methodology for evaluation of response cost. The pro-
posed model identifies three main components that consti-
tute response cost, namely, response operational cost, the
response goodness in mitigating the damage incurred by the
detected intrusion(s) and the response impact on the system.
These response metrics provide a consistent basis for evalu-
ation across systems, while allowing the response cost to be
adapted with respect to the security policy and properties
of specific system environment. This approach takes advan-
tage of the accuracy inherent in expert assignment of val-
ues, and combines it with a structured calculation of relative
values, resulting in flexibility and consistency. Importantly,
this approach is practically implementable in a real-world
environment, making response cost assessment accessible to
system administrators with a range of system expertise.
The presented work is the initial step in the direction of es-
tablishing standardized response metrics which opens a wide
field for future research avenues. One direction we plan to
explore is the role of the individual system resource charac-
teristics in the overall resource value assessment. A second
potentially fruitful direction is the comparison of cost fac-
tors with economic principles, allowing the application of
established economic cost models. Automated refinement
of response impact on system resources based on past de-
ployment is another possibility of future work, as is a more
structured and rigorous approach to assigning and scaling.
Finally, we also plan to focus on experimentation with real
system settings which might give a deeper insight into eval-
uation process advantages.
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